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Abstract - Child marriage is a human rights violation according to various
international agreements and human rights conventions. In many countries the
practice is outlawed, yet it persists with great incidence in both developed and
developing societies. Governments must act to eliminate the practice which (1) results
in physical and psychological individual harms for child brides; (2) perpetuates societal
harms in the form of entrenched gender inequality and limited economic potential for
women and for countries as a whole; (3) thrives on the exploitation of economic and
agency vulnerabilities of a social class, namely young girls and women; and (4)
threatens the agency and autonomy of market “participants,” thereby characterizing
the market in child marriage as a “noxious market,” according to Debra Satz’s
framework, in the strongest sense. To best respond to the harms and negative effects of
the market, governments need to understand the reasons why the practice persists,
even though it is illegal. Among the most cited motivators of child marriage are
economic circumstance (i.e., poverty) and dated or unfounded beliefs relating to the
economic potential of young girls and women. Governments can address these
motivators, and thereby (begin to) eradicate the practice of child marriage, through
improvements to and expansion of social welfare programs and through targeted
educational initiatives which stress the economic opportunity available to and earnings
potential of young girls.
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Introduction
UNICEF defines child marriage as “any formal marriage or informal union
between a child under the age of 18 and an adult or another child.”1 Child marriage is
not only a violation of human rights according to international agreements and
conventions like the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights2 and the
UN’s Convention on the Rights of the Child,3 but it is also widely outlawed. Even so,
the practice persists at alarming rates around the world, namely in South Asia and subSaharan Africa. South Asia accounts for more than 40% of the global total of child
marriages.4 Bangladesh, Nepal, and India are among the countries with the highest
prevalence of child marriage in the world.5 The COVID-19 pandemic, in particular,
has led to a spike in child marriage in parts of India. Data from the western Indian
state of Maharashtra shows that officials halted over 200 child marriages between
April and August of 2020, whereas only about half that number were halted in the
previous 12 months.6 In sub-Saharan Africa, meanwhile, UNICEF reports that 37%
of women marry before the age of 18; more than two-thirds of women in Niger and
Chad marry before they turn 18.7 While I’ve highlighted a few of the regions in which
the market is most prevalent, child marriage is undoubtedly a global phenomenon
which permeates developed and developing nations, alike. In what follows, I will
focus on the cases in which a female child (under the age of 18) is forced to marry an
adult male (often much older), as such cases are not only more prevalent, but are also
considered to be more harmful and problematic.8
In this paper, I argue that the pervasive market in child marriage satisfies each
of the four parameters of noxious markets offered by Debra Satz. After a brief
“Child Marriage,” UNICEF, September 2020, https://www.unicef.org/protection/child-marriage.
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, accessed November 5, 2020,
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
3
“Convention on the Rights of the Child,” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed
November 5, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx.
4
“Fast Facts: 10 facts illustrating why we must #EndChildMarriage,” UNICEF, February 11, 2019,
https://www.unicef.org/eca/press-releases/fast-facts-10-facts-illustrating-why-we-mustendchildmarriage.
5
Deepali Gohda, David Hotchkiss, and Anastasia Gage, “Association Between Child Marriage and
Reproductive Health Outcomes and Service Utilization: A Multi-Country Study from South Asia,”
Journal of Adolescent Health 52 (January 2013): 554. https://cdn.icmec.org.
6
Lauren Frayer and Sushmita Pathak, “Child Marriages Are Up In The Pandemic. Here’s How India
Tries To Stop Them,” last modified November 5, 2020,
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/11/05/931274119/child-marriages-are-up-inthe-pandemic-heres-how-india-tries-to-stop-them.
7
“Child marriage around the world,” UNICEF, March 11, 2020,
https://www.unicef.org/stories/child-marriage-around-world.
8
“Child Marriage,” UNICEF, September 2020, https://www.unicef.org/protection/child-marriage.
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description of Satz’s conception of noxious markets, I will analyze the distinct harms
resulting from the institution, or practice, of child marriage which contribute to its
noxiousness. These harms include physiological and psychological harms imposed on
the children, or individuals, involved, deepened gender inequalities and the
perpetuation of poverty in society, the exploitation of (primarily economic)
vulnerabilities, and threats to the agency of the market’s “participants.” Then, I will
examine what I take to be a few of the primary economic motivations for child
marriage, namely economic circumstance (i.e., poverty) and false prudential beliefs,
and will describe how policymakers and governmental institutions might effectively
address these.

Satz’s Framework
Broadly, Debra Satz describes a “noxious market” as a system which
undermines the conditions necessary for individuals to act and transact as equals.9
More specifically, and perhaps more importantly, Satz describes four parameters
which characterize noxious markets. The first two parameters Satz offers relate to the
outcomes of such markets. First, noxious markets can produce harmful outcomes for
individuals.10 Markets which satisfy this parameter might impose physical harms onto
participants or otherwise affect their general welfare, for example. Second, noxious
markets can produce outcomes which are harmful at the societal level.11 Markets
which produce this outcome might undermine democratic institutions or threaten
equality in society through institutions which promote servility. The second set of
these parameters offered by Satz relates to the conditions of some agents or
participants within the market (i.e., the noxiousness stems from the “source” of the
market). With this in mind, Satz’s third parameter of noxious markets states that such
markets can be characterized by weak agency and asymmetric knowledge among some
or many of its participants.12 This can occur when market participants are given
incomplete or faulty information about the risks and consequences associated with
participation in a market, or when someone enters a market on another individual’s
behalf. Finally, the fourth parameter she sets forth in characterizing noxious markets
states that such markets can exploit relevant vulnerabilities of some or many
participants in the market.13 Markets in which participants have vastly unequal needs
Debra Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets (New York, New
York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 94.
10
Satz, 94.
11
Satz, 95.
12
Satz, 96.
13
Satz, 97.
9
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and demands for a certain good, or in which agents’ poverty is exploited, would
illustrate this characteristic. Now, I will identify some of the distinct harms resulting
from the institution of child marriage as they relate to these parameters and will
describe how the market in child marriage qualifies as a noxious market in the
strongest sense.

Child Marriage as a Noxious Market
The market in child marriage leads to many deeply destructive harms which
correspond to Satz’s aforementioned conditions of noxious markets. In this section, I
argue that each of the four parameters, or “dimensions,”14 detailed above are satisfied
in the market in child marriage. First, I will explore the harms incurred onto the
individual “participants” in the market.
i.

Individual Harms

Child marriage invokes a sense of moral repugnance for many in the Western
world, who often cite a lack of consent, or agency, as an offending aspect of the
practice. While this is certainly a disturbing aspect of the market (and one which I will
explore in detail), there also exist resulting harms which are far more tangible/salient.
As described above, the “individual harms” characteristic of noxious markets refers to
the outcomes resulting from participation in a market which produce destitution or
other harms to the basic welfare or agency interests of the relevant market’s
participants.15 I will first describe some of the prevalent physical harms associated with
child marriage and will then delve into the distinct psychological harms stemming from
the practice.
Young girls entered into marriage experience myriad physical harms, including
harms relating to domestic abuse, early sexual activity, and early pregnancy. Even
though many children are entered into marriage with the intention of protecting them
from violence and harassment,16 girls married before the age of 18 are more likely to
experience physical and sexual violence in their marriages than those who marry as
adults.17 Lacking education, autonomy, and agency, child brides are not only
particularly vulnerable to domestic abuse, but they are also more likely to believe that
Satz, 98.
Satz, 98.
16
Jennifer Parsons et al., “Economic Impacts of Child Marriage: A Review of the Literature,” The
Review of Faith and International Affairs 13, no. 3 (October 2015): 16. https://www.tandfonline.com.
17
K.G. Santhya et al., “Associations Between Early Marriage and Young Women's Marital and
Reproductive Health Outcomes: Evidence from India,” International Perspectives on Sexual and
Reproductive Health 36, no. 3 (September 2010): 135. https://www-jstor-org.proxy.library.upenn.edu/.
14
15
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such treatment is somehow justified.18 I will explore this idea further in the next
subsection, on societal harms.
Early brides are often expected and pressured to have children soon after
marriage. In this way, the right to not engage in sexual activity and the freedom to
decide if and when to reproduce are largely absent in child marriages.19 This
represents a harm to the agency interests of these young girls and is also the root
cause of the numerous physical and reproductive harms experienced by early brides.
With their weakened (or complete lack of) agency, child brides are more susceptible to
early and unprotected sex than women who marry after turning eighteen, putting
them at increased risk of sexually transmitted and other diseases, like HIV, as well as
early pregnancy. Not having the physiological maturity or capacity to healthily birth
children so early, adolescent mothers face increased risks during pregnancy, too,
including higher rates of eclampsia (convulsions caused by high blood pressure in
pregnant women), postpartum hemorrhage, sepsis, obstructed labor, and maternal
mortality (pregnancy-related death), among others.20 Those who are fortunate enough
to survive early pregnancy often deal with lasting physical and reproductive health
issues.
Additionally, adolescent mothers are much more likely to deliver preterm or
low-birthweight infants than mothers over the age of 19. Worse, infant mortality rates
are 60% higher when the mother is younger than eighteen. Once again, such issues
and risks are largely due to the physical immaturity of these adolescent mothers.
Additionally, poor nutrition, decreased access to medical and social services, and
increased risk of disease contribute to these infant harms.21 There are certainly
significant harms thrust onto early brides stemming from child marriage and early
pregnancy, and additional harms are passed along to the children of these adolescent
mothers.
Child marriage also leads to deeply deleterious psychological harms. Even in
places where child marriage is considered to be a norm, marrying early is strongly
associated with negative psychological outcomes, including depression, anxiety, and
other mechanisms of psychological distress.22 Furthermore, young girls participating
in the market are outrightly denied their childhood. Immediately following their
Santhya et al., 136.
UNICEF, “Early Marriage: Child Spouses,” Innocenti Digest 7 (March 2001): 9.
https://www.unicef-irc.org/.
20
Nawal Nour, “Child Marriage: A Silent Health and Human Rights Issue,” Reviews in Obstetrics and
Gynecology 2, no. 1 (2009): 54. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/.
21
Nour, 54.
22
Neetu A. John et al., “Child marriage and psychological well-being in Niger and Ethiopia,” BMC
Public Health 19 (2019): 1. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/.
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19
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marriage, many young girls are expected to fulfill the traditional roles of a wife,
domestic worker, and—often soon after marriage—mother. Performing the duties
often associated with these traditional roles so early in life denies these girls the
opportunity to an education, as well as opportunities for social development among
friends and family. As a result, many experience feelings of isolation and depression.23
Children who attempt to flee their marriages (in an effort to avoid these harms)
by returning home to their parents may be beaten and sent back to their husbands.24
Elders in these communities are rarely sympathetic to the physical and psychological
traumas experienced by girls through child marriage—many see these harms as an
“unavoidable part of life.”25 This sentiment begins to illustrate some of the disturbing
societal harms provoked by markets in child marriage, which I will explore next.
ii.

Societal Harms

Generally, the market in child marriage promotes attitudes within societies
which treat some individuals (young girls and women) as mere products, or property,
rather than as beings worthy of respect and moral consideration. This perspective
violates the liberal and democratic qualities which many of the aforementioned
countries’ governments aim to promote (e.g., India and Bangladesh, among many
others).
As mentioned in the previous subsection, girls who marry early are more likely
to experience physical abuse in their marriages. Even worse, early brides tend to
believe wife-beating is “justified” more than those who marry after turning 18.26 This
belief can be attributed to the pervasive gender inequality which is entrenched in
many societies in which child marriage is prevalent. The continued practice of child
marriage further imbeds these attitudes of inequality and confined gender roles.
Because of child marriage, young girls and women are not granted the opportunity to
interact as equals. Instead, they are conditioned “to be docile and servile” and are
“shape[d]…into passive accepters of a status quo.”27
This status quo not only threatens the liberties and human rights of young girls
and women, but it has also been shown to result in deeper economic issues, not only
for individuals, but also for society at large. Child marriage can significantly disrupt,

Nour, 53-54.
Sarah Leduc, “Bangladesh’s ‘Wedding buster’ takes on illegal child marriage,” last modified
October 11, 2016, https://www.france24.com/en/20161011-bangladesh-child-marriagesinternational-day-girl-child-radha-rani-sarker.
25
UNICEF, “Early Marriage: Child Spouses,” Innocenti Digest 7 (March 2001): 9.
https://www.unicef-irc.org/.
26
Santhya et al., 136.
27
Satz, 95.
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and often put an end to, the educational path of young girls.28 The earlier a girl
marries, the less schooling/education she can be expected to complete. The less
schooling a girl completes, the less likely she is to develop skills (vocational, technical,
etc.) necessary for participation in the labor force, the less she can be expected to earn
across her lifetime, and the less likely she is to participate in political processes and
discourse. The intergenerational practice of child marriage further reinforces this cycle
of limited earning and political potential for a mother’s children (and her children’s
children, and so on) and stunts a nation’s economic and GDP growth.
With these limitations on earning potential and decision-making/agency, child
brides become increasingly dependent on their husbands. This dependence
undermines the concepts of equal treatment of and equal standing between persons in
democratic societies. So, while the individual harms inflicted by child marriage are
deeply disturbing and worrisome, governments should be particularly wary of the
societal impacts of the institution, which often act against the aims and goals of the
state.
iii.

Vulnerability

Satz writes that some markets highlight the vulnerabilities of one of the
transacting parties.29 I argue that child marriage is an example of a market which not
only survives, but thrives, off of one transacting party’s exploitation of the other’s
economic and social vulnerabilities.
As I will discuss in greater detail in the next section, poverty and related
economic factors and beliefs are a primary motivator of child marriage’s continued
practice. Young girls are viewed as mere economic burdens in many countries around
the world. This motivates parents to marry off their daughters earlier. In their view,
marriage not only offers a form of economic protection for their child, but also
relieves parents of the financial burden imposed by a daughter and often results in
direct economic payment for the girl’s family in the form of a bride wealth or bride
price. Typically, the younger the child, the higher the payment and the sooner the
economic burden is lifted. Similarly, where a dowry—a payment or transfer of assets
from the bride’s family to the groom’s family—is required, young girls’ parents are
incentivized to marry off their daughters at a younger age, as younger and less
educated brides tend to require smaller dowries.30
Poverty drives individuals and families to participate in the market in child
marriage, and sheer economic need often dictates the terms at which the ‘transactions’
Parsons et al., 14.
Satz, 97.
30
Parsons et al., 13.
28
29

Penn Journal of Philosophy Politics and Economics | Volume 16 | Spring 2021

20

Child Marriage as a Noxious Market
are made. I will illustrate this parameter of noxious markets with an unrelated
example. Suppose a father falls on hard times. The father typically provides for his
family, but with the recent loss of his job, he is unable to offer them financial support.
To compensate for his and his family’s economic hardship, the father begins to sell
old sports memorabilia, which he values greatly, to his neighbors. The neighbors,
knowing that the father needs the money to feed himself and his family and has little
room/capacity to negotiate, offer bids for these items which are well below market
value. The father accepts these low bids because he knows he has no choice or
alternative: he and his family need the money to live. Even though the exchange
results in a relative improvement in his well-being (i.e., immediate cash payment),
there is reason to believe that in another circumstance he would not have accepted the
low-ball bids on these objects. Regardless, his conniving neighbors exploited his
economic vulnerability to achieve maximal benefit from the transaction. The
overarching point is this: economic vulnerabilities of families can dictate the terms at
which “transactions” are performed within the market in child marriage. Economic
need alone can dictate both the availability and price of young girls on the market, as
parents act not necessarily in their or their children’s best interest, but in the interest
of relative improvement in their financial status and well-being.
Additionally, the effects of gender inequality and the general lack of agency
among women in many of the aforementioned countries and regions result in further
vulnerabilities. Young girls may be raised to believe that their status as women implies
their participation in institutions such as child marriage. Girls who are taught to
engage in these practices because they believe that it is an “unavoidable part of life”
(or because they lack the agency and/or education to arrive at another conclusion) are
exploited to satisfy the preferences and cultural practices of their families and their
husbands/in-laws.
iv.

Weak Agency

Finally, there also exist disturbing practices in the market in child marriage
relating to the levels of agency of “participants” in the market. Thus far throughout
this paper, I have decided to quote “participants” because many children entered into
these markets are not willing participants. Instead, young girls are often coerced or
forced into these unions by parents, guardians, or other authority figures in their lives.
To me, the term “participant” implies a level of willingness or voluntariness when
associated with involvement in a market. I want to be clear that this sense of
voluntariness is often absent in child marriages.
There is an obvious relationship between the lack of agency in markets in child
marriage and the harms I have outlined above; the absence of individual autonomy in
the market relates strongly to the aforementioned individual and societal
consequences, in particular. I argue that there are two primary ways in which a child’s
Penn Journal of Philosophy Politics and Economics | Volume 16 | Spring 2021
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levels of agency are threatened in this market. First, as mentioned above, children are
often entered into markets in child marriage not by themselves, but by others—
typically parents or other family members—on their behalf. In fact, many children are
given no choice in the matter; such cases are blatant, clear-cut examples of how
“participant” agency, autonomy, and decision-making ability are not only weak, but
completely absent in the market.
Second, even if we accept that there are cases in which a child is not forced,
coerced, or unknowingly entered into an early marriage (and certainly such cases
exist), there is reason to believe that children are not given adequate information
about the consequences of child marriage in such cases. 31 If a child were fully aware
of the increased risk she faced with respect to physical abuse, psychological harm, and
pregnancy/sexual health issues, or the economic and educational opportunity she
would forfeit as a result of her willing entry into a premature marriage, she might be
less willing to submit herself as an early bride. In cases in which a child is aware of
these harms and consequences, suicide is common.32 So, even if a child exhibits full
autonomy or decision-making ability with respect to her decision to marry early, her
agency is not necessarily strong if full or adequate information regarding the
consequences, dangers, and risks associated with her participation in the market is not
disclosed.
Similarly, parents might convince their children that early marriage is their only
option. Persuaded by social norms, cultural practices, religious traditions, and/or
economic pressures, among other factors, parents weaken the agency of their children
by failing to recognize, consider, and disclose easily available (and likely less harmful)
alternatives to child marriage.
It is clear, then, that the market in child marriage qualifies as a noxious market
in the strongest sense; as I argue above, each of Satz’s four conditions are satisfied by
the market. So, how can governments and NGOs address this clearly problematic, yet
seemingly elusive, issue? In what ways can policy solutions effectively mitigate not
only the prevalence of the market, but also the effects of the harms I describe above?
To (begin to) answer these questions, we must understand why child marriage
happens, even when it is against the law. In the next section, I will examine one of the
underlying motivations for the continued practice of child marriage and will offer
ways in which governments and NGOs might effectively respond in this case.

Satz, 98. As Satz writes here, inadequate information about the nature and consequences of a
market depicts weak agency.
32
“Child, early and forced marriage, including in humanitarian settings,” Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed November 7, 2020,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/WRGS/Pages/ChildMarriage.aspx.
31
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Economic Motivations of Child Marriage and their Policy
Implications
Even with the presence of laws prohibiting the practice around the world, child
marriage is still a vastly prevalent practice driven largely by several underlying
motivations and deeply held convictions. To understand the ways in which policy can
effectively mitigate (and hopefully end) this harmful practice, policymakers must
recognize these motivations. In what follows, I will explore the complexities of child
marriage’s economic motivations. I will further detail the role of poverty and will
describe the prudential (or economic) beliefs and attitudes which contribute to the
continued prevalence of the market. I do not intend to suggest that these are the only
motivations for child marriage, nor do I argue that these motivations are more
important or more prevalent than others. Instead, I take these to be among the most
commonly cited motivators of child marriage and I hope to offer insight with respect
to the ways in which governments, NGOs, and other relevant stakeholders can more
effectively address these economic motivations through policy solutions.
i. Addressing Poverty
Addressing the economic motivations of child marriage begins with addressing
the issue of poverty. Studies show that in countries where poverty has decreased, so
has the incidence of child marriage.33 Tackling poverty is undoubtedly a tall order, but
governments worldwide have made significant strides in reducing the global
prevalence of poverty by more than half since 2000.34 Governments can implement
several policy and educational mechanisms to fully eradicate the intergenerational and
perpetuating causes and effects of child marriage, including poverty, and to ensure
that the transition away from child marriage is incentivized for young girls, their
parents, and their families.
One obvious way to address poverty in the context of child marriage is to make
schooling not only more widely available and of higher quality for young girls, but also
to make it compulsory. By mandating that young girls stay in school up to a certain
age, governments are not only able to reduce the incidence of child marriage, but they
are also able to increase a young girl’s (and her family’s) future expected earnings,
lower the likelihood she experiences domestic violence during marriage, and increase
her agency and decision-making ability. However, compulsory education is by no
means an original suggestion; many countries, including those which struggle with
child marriage the most, currently have laws which mandate that children attend
Nour, 54.
“Ending Poverty,” United Nations, accessed November 30, 2020,
https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/poverty/.
33
34
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school up to a certain age. But, in India, for example, that age is only fourteen.35 In
Niger, fifteen. To stave off child marriage, these and other governments can raise the
upper limit for compulsory education and more effectively enforce such laws.
The United States, although not completely void of the practice, keeps child
marriage incidence low not only because of its relatively successful effort to prevent
poverty (in relation to many developing nations, at least), but also because of relatively
high age requirements for compulsory school attendance. At minimum, U.S. states
require children to remain in school until sixteen, while some require attendance until
the age of eighteen.36 Countries which struggle with child marriage might consider
raising their compulsory schooling ages to further discourage early/child marriage and
to ensure that children are offered a higher minimum standard of educational
opportunity while being able to develop adequate agency, decision-making skills,
autonomy, and economic potential.
In Niger, over half of children aged 7 to 16 are not enrolled in school, leaving
the country among the lowest ranked in West Africa in terms of literacy rate.37 While
there are a few reasons for this (including geographical gaps and economic barriers to
education, which the government undoubtedly needs to address), the lack of
community compliance with existing compulsory education/school-age laws is among
the most concerning. To ensure compliance, governments might consider investments
into a mandatory child registry to document child births and school records. Records
would be required even—or perhaps particularly—in the most remote areas. The
feasibility of such a program might be difficult to guarantee, but this registry—
coupled with cooperation from education officials, teachers, community leaders, and
law enforcement—will exist to ensure that all children are enrolled in school until the
prescribed age outlined in relevant school-age policies, at minimum. Frequent
absences from or failure to attend school prior to being “of age” in accordance with
legislation would result in fines and investigation. Fines can be pooled into a fund
which feeds back into government investment in education systems and
infrastructure, while investigations should comprise of police inquiry to ensure no
child has been pre-maturely married.
Furthermore, investments in the quality of education and in educational
infrastructure (i.e., school buildings themselves) are necessary to combat child
Stefan Trines, “Education in India,” last modified September 13, 2018,
https://wenr.wes.org/2018/09/education-inindia#:~:text=Education%20in%20India%20is%20compulsory,of%20charge%20at%20public%20s
chools.
36
“Table 5.1.” National Center for Education Statistics, accessed December 3, 2020,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/tab5_1.asp.
37
“Education,” UNICEF, accessed December 1, 2020, https://www.unicef.org/niger/education.
35
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marriage. As mentioned above, many children in Niger do not attend school due to
wide geographical gaps in school sites. It is not a coincidence that Niger is ranked
among the highest in the world in terms of incidence of child marriage. Additional
school buildings and qualified teachers must be introduced to these areas to help.
Additionally, India struggles with teacher truancy in its public schools.38 To adequately
educate children, governments need to incentivize teachers by ensuring adequate
funding for teacher salaries and investing in bearable workplace/classroom
conditions. Creating government programs or funds to incentivize careers in primary
and secondary education (through direct payment or university tuition subsidies, for
example) and—once again—improving educational infrastructure are great ways to
start.
Education is a crucial ingredient for the eradication of both poverty and child
marriage. Governments serious about eliminating the practice need to invest in stateprovided education systems while ensuring that children are attending school to
decrease the likelihood and incidence of the practice and to maximize their economic
opportunity.
Countries might also consider increasing access to water sources, particularly in
rural or otherwise remote areas. People, and particularly young girls and women, in
developing nations spend hours walking to and from water sources each day. Not
only is limited access to clean water responsible for health issues and diseases which
bring about economic burdens for both individuals and governments (e.g., healthcare
costs, lower earnings and levels of productivity, etc.), but the time spent acquiring this
necessary good takes away from individuals’ being able to contribute to the labor
force. This stifles earnings and economic potential, thereby contributing to the
perpetuation of poverty and increasing the likelihood of child marriage. With
improved infrastructure and access to clean water, individuals can live longer and
more comfortably, and can better contribute to their country’s economy and their
own earning potential. Partnerships with NGOs and charities which work to increase
access to clean water—like ‘charity: water,’39 for example—can prove useful in
promoting health and wellness in these communities, increasing productivity, and
shifting public priorities from ‘Where can my family and I get clean water today?’ to
‘Which job opportunity offers the greatest earning potential?’
Furthermore, although potentially controversial in practice, efforts to slow
population growth can prove useful in both slowing the incidence of child marriage
and decreasing the incidence of poverty. Child marriage provokes high levels of
fertility; early brides become pregnant early and, on average, procreate in higher
Geeta Anand, “Fighting Truancy Among India’s Teachers, With a Pistol and a Stick,” last
modified February 19, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/20/world/asia/india-primaryschool-system-uttar-pradesh.html.
39
“About Us,” charity: water, accessed December 3, 2020, https://www.charitywater.org/about.
38
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incidence compared to women who marry and become mothers later in life.40 Families
with more children carry greater economic burdens, as they require higher economic
capacity to pay for food, education, healthcare, and other necessities for each of their
children, thereby reducing their standard of living and perpetuating the cycle of
poverty. Additionally, higher population levels increase the demand for social and
welfare services from the government. While policies like China’s former one-child
policy unquestionably carry moral baggage as potential human rights violations (I do
not advocate for such a policy), countries struggling with child marriage, poverty, and
population growth can implement positive incentives and robust family planning
services to decrease population levels, thereby diminishing the likelihood of harms
linked to early pregnancy, normalizing later pregnancy, and decreasing the prevalence
of and pressures associated with child marriage.
Expansions of programs similar to India’s Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana
Yojana, which is a cash transfer benefits program for first-time mothers over the age of
19,41 would serve as further incentive for young girls to delay pregnancy to adulthood.
Limiting and disincentivizing early pregnancy (and thereby removing worries of
pregnancy outside of wedlock) might also remove the social pressures surrounding
child marriage for many families.
Along these lines, governments can implement tax breaks, or even direct cash
payments, for newly married couples in which the bride is over the age of eighteen, or
for families who delay their daughter’s marriage until after she turns eighteen. In
conjunction with greater oversight of marriage practices, these are a few ways in
which governments can incentivize couples and families to delay marriage until
adulthood.
Although fiscally daunting, governments might also explore the potential for a
universal basic income (UBI) to stave off poverty and to address concerns of
economic domination of one social class (in this case, men) over another (women). In
conjunction with effective inflation control, UBIs can alleviate many of the economic
pressures which families face, thereby decreasing the economic need and pressure for
child marriage. Additionally, UBIs can decrease the dependence of young girls and
their families on grooms and the institution of child marriage. However, a lack of
evidence with respect to UBIs in practice means that there is not much empirical
research to support its implementation, so developing nations and economies could
Sanni Yaya et al., “Prevalence of child marriage and its impact on fertility outcomes in 34 subSaharan African countries,” BMC International Health and Human Rights 19 (2019): 1.
https://bmcinthealthhumrights.biomedcentral.com/.
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“Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana,” Ministry of Women and Child Development (Government of
India: New Delhi), accessed November 30, 2020,
https://wcd.nic.in/sites/default/files/FINAL%20PMMVY%20%28FAQ%29%20BOOKELT.pdf.
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be understandably cautious in considering this option. To start, however, developing
governments can experiment by implementing small-scale rollouts of UBI programs
to impoverished and economically desperate communities first. This will immediately
improve the economic status of the most vulnerable while serving as an experiment,
of sorts, to test the effectiveness of such a policy initiative.
Addressing the issue of poverty in the context of child marriage rests heavily on
increasing financial stability within communities, through increased individual
purchasing power—or, in other words, more cash in the hands of individuals—and
strengthening agency and economic potential through education. Historically, such
governmental intervention and involvement have proven to be effective methods of
economic recovery and poverty eradication. FDR’s welfare and public assistance
programs rescued an economically depressed United States in the 1930s. Similar
efforts by Park Chung-hee’s government lifted much of Korea out of poverty
following years of widespread economic desperation and destitution resulting from
the Korean War.42 Similar investments into institutional development will reap
beneficial economic returns and will, in turn, help to lower the incidence of child
marriage around the world.
ii.

Addressing False Economic Attitudes and Prudential Beliefs

While poverty is a primary motivator of the continued practice of child
marriage, the practice is also driven by dated and, frankly, incorrect economic
attitudes and beliefs relating to the economic potential of young girls and women. As
mentioned previously, girls are often seen as economic burdens for families, rather
than as valuable members of communities and local economies. Such attitudes fail to
recognize the economic potential for girls and women outside of marriage. To best
address these, governments should not only introduce educational initiatives for girls,
their families, and community leaders to alter the incorrect assumptions of female
economic potential, but they should put forth concerted efforts aimed at increasing
economic opportunity for women.
Instilling in young girls and women a belief in their economic potential can
greatly decrease the incidence of economic dependence of young girls on men,
thereby strengthening the agency of these girls and reducing the likelihood of
subordination, dependence, and abuse due to economic circumstance. Additionally,
increasing young girls’ (and their families’) awareness of economic opportunity and
the potential for financial independence through education and employment will
Huck-ju Kwon and Ilcheong Yi, “Economic Development and Poverty Reduction in Korea:
Governing Multifunctional Institutions,” Institute for Future Studies and Swedish Institute for
Social Research (September 2008), 6. https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/.
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further disincentivize early marriage. With increased knowledge of both their earning
potential and employment opportunity, child marriage might not seem like the best
available option for these girls and their families. Stressing not only the immediate,
but also the future economic benefits of education and employment will be crucial for
successfully altering these beliefs and norms. Programs like Ishraq (Egypt) and
PRACHAR (India) are examples of such educational/empowerment initiatives in
practice. These programs have been found to be effective in not only empowering
girls with information, but also in changing wider, community attitudes and behavior
related to female economic opportunity and child marriage.43 Expansions on such
programs are necessary.
Equally important is the concerted effort to support and create productive job
opportunities for women. Coupled with investments in education, job creation is
crucial to both eliminating poverty and changing economic attitudes of girls and
community members. Jobs, of course, provide essential income and empower
individuals—especially young women.44 Informing girls and their families of the
myriad opportunities in self-employment, government/bureaucratic capacities, and
the private sector is essential to altering their economic beliefs. Governments can
incentivize private businesses and companies to offer jobs to young women, and
particularly those in rural areas, through tax incentives or direct employee salary
subsidies. Compliance with and enforcement of anti-discrimination employment laws,
which exist in each of the countries I mentioned in the introduction, as well as many
others, will be crucial for economic and attitudinal progress.
Finally, ensuring adequate political access, participation, and representation of
marginalized groups is crucial to escaping poverty and child marriage, as well as
altering ‘traditional’ gender roles. Having diverse (and effective) governments and
bureaucratic institutions is essential for economic development and policymaking.
Involving women and other underrepresented groups in governmental and political
processes increases their decision-making ability and agency. Furthermore, greater
female involvement in political capacities increases the likelihood of investment in
social programs and services, including education and other welfare benefits
programs.45
iii.

A Note Regarding Enforcement

Anju Malhotra et al., “Solutions to End Child Marriage: What the Evidence Shows,” International
Center for Research on Women (2011): 12. https://www.healthynewbornnetwork.org/.
44
“Employment and Decent Work,” United Nations, accessed December 1, 2020,
https://www.un.org/development/desa/socialperspectiveondevelopment/issues/employment-anddecent-work.html.
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Once again, in many countries, there already exist legal and policy frameworks
at the national and local levels which prohibit child marriage. But, in order to put an
end to the practice, these frameworks, coupled with the initiatives I’ve offered above,
need to be introduced in conjunction with more consistent enforcement mechanisms
and, potentially, harsher punitive measures. While I concede that enforcement in this
negative sense—that is, through limitation, regulation, and hardline punitive
measures—is not necessarily effective (take, for example, the United States’ war on
drugs, which hasn’t entirely eliminated the market in illegal drugs), governments need
to commit money and resources for oversight in often-ignored communities, and
particularly rural and remote areas, to root out child marriage. In addition, corrupt
practices to obtain special access or privilege—like hush-money payments to
government officials or law enforcement, for example—need to desist for effective
implementation to take place.
The World Bank reported that if Niger had been able to completely eliminate
child marriage in 2015, then by 2030 it would have accrued up to $1.7 billion in
additional welfare, $327 million in savings for its education budget, and $34 million in
savings through reduced infant mortality. Based on these sample estimates alone,
governments themselves should be incentivized and motivated to make concerted
efforts to decrease the prevalence of child marriage.46 The potential economic benefits
are massive.
Child marriage is undoubtedly a social and human rights issue, but my aim in
this section was to illustrate the numerous ways in which the practice translates into
an economic issue, as well. The policy proposals I have offered in this section will
certainly require time, cooperation, and (a lot of) money. But, as I hope to have
shown, there is reason to believe that developing countries that engage in these efforts
will be rewarded through sizable economic gains and increased productivity. Being
able to reinvest these savings and net gains into communities, educational endeavors,
and other social/welfare programs will assist in fully eradicating the practice of child
marriage and, with it, the intergenerational effects of poverty.

Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed many of the distinct harms resulting from the
seemingly elusive market(s) in child marriage and have argued that such a market
sufficiently satisfies each of the conditions which characterize noxious markets in
Debra Satz’s view. I have also identified economic motivators which feed into the
prevalence of markets in child marriage, including poverty and misguided prudential
Quentin Wodon et al., “Economic Impacts of Child Marriage: Global Synthesis Report,” The
World Bank (June 2017): 38-42. http://documents1.worldbank.org/.
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beliefs. While the current rate of child marriage is undoubtedly alarming, I would be
remiss if I failed to recognize and emphasize the important steps already taken by
many governments, NGOs, and advocacy groups across the world to reduce the
incidence of the practice and to mitigate the inevitable harms rooted in this
institution. Many South Asian countries, including India and Bangladesh, have
implemented national and state-specific action plans in an effort to change social
norms and attitudes, empower girls through education, and make apparent the distinct
harms caused by child marriage.47 NGOs like the UN and UNICEF, as well as
advocacy groups like Girls Not Brides, have also done important work in ensuring
that governments continue to strive to protect and promote the well-being of girls
susceptible to child marriage.
Finally, as I have hinted in the previous section, I think there is much to be
gained from attempting to understand the weight and force of the many institutions
and motivations acting against the complete abolishment of child marriage. Grappling
with the influences of the economic drivers of the market in child marriage is an
important step, but analyzing the social, cultural, attitudinal, and religious forces
prodding the market is an equally important task in better understanding the
challenges which governments and policymakers face in eradicating child marriage.
For example, marriage can be a deeply religious ritual; child marriage might even be
considered a requirement, of sorts, in some religious communities, leading to
resistance in complying with governmental efforts to eliminate the practice. Further
issues and complexities arise in theocratic regimes and states; while countries like
India and Bangladesh have secular, liberal governments, challenges arise where the
values to human rights and related agreements and conventions simply do not
supersede religious aims and cultural norms. Further questions and discourse lie in
determining how clear human rights violations, like markets in child marriage, are
addressed in deeply religious, culturally unyielding, or otherwise policy-resistant
communities.
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